No more Twinkies?! Hostess to close

It's true. Hostess Brands, maker of Twinkies, Ding Dongs and Wonder Bread said Friday that it has filed a motion in Bankruptcy Court seeking permission to close and sell its assets, including its iconic brands.
Nov 16, 2012


The company says it has suspended bakery operations, but deliveries will continue and Hostess retail stores will stay open to sell products already in the pipeline.

Hostess workers remained on picket lines across the country Thursday night, refusing a company ultimatum to return to work or face the liquidation of the national baker.

The company had warned it would file a motion in U.S. Bankruptcy Court to shut operations if enough workers didn't end their weeklong strike by 5 p.m. Thursday.

A shutdown would result in the loss of about 18,000 jobs.

Privately held Hostess filed for Chapter 11 protection in January, its second trip through bankruptcy court in less than a decade. The company cited increasing pension and medical costs for employees as one of the drivers behind its latest filing. Hostess contends workers must make concessions for it to exit bankruptcy and improve its financial position.

The company, founded in 1930, is fighting battles beyond labor costs, however. Competition is increasing in the snack market, while Americans are increasingly conscious about healthful eating. Hostess also makes Dolly Madison, Drake's and Nature's Pride snacks.

The Teamsters union is urging the bakers union to hold a secret ballot on whether to continue striking. Citing its financial experts who had access to the company's books, the Teamsters say that Hostess' warning of liquidation is "not an empty threat or a negotiating tactic" but a certain outcome if workers keep striking.

Hostess, based in Irving, Texas, already has reached a contract agreement while in bankruptcy with its largest union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. But thousands of members in its second biggest union went on strike late last week after rejecting a contract offer that cut wages and benefits.

The Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union said the company stopped contributing to workers' pensions last year, and the union wants pension benefits restored.

Production at about a dozen of the company's 33 plants has been seriously affected by the strike, said Lance Ignon, a Hostess spokesman.

"Do it, shut it down," a woman yelled at 5 p.m. Thursday from the picket line formed at the company's Indianapolis plant.

As many as 45 people in the picket line chanted, "No pension, no deal," as they walked a tight circle in the growing cold and gathering darkness.

Their picketing drew frequent supportive honks from passing drivers.

Wedrick Hollingsworth, business agent for Local 372-B of the bakers union, said union members took wage and benefit concessions four years ago and are unwilling to accept further wage cuts and reductions in health and pension benefits sought by the company. "It's just too much for these employees to accept. We gave concessions four years ago."

John Smith, a wrapper operator at the plant who has worked for Hostess for 22 years, said he's at peace with his decision to join the strikers. "You have to take a stand for what you believe in. They gave us a take-it-or-leave-it deal. We can't take the financial abuse."

Hollingsworth, warmly dressed in coveralls and a hooded sweatshirt, said union members would man the picket line outside the plant round-the-clock. Workers erected a tent and were burning wood fires in two grills to help stay warm.

Several private security officers watched the strikers from the gate of the plant, which normally runs its ovens 24 hours a day turning out bread, buns, mini-doughnuts and muffins.

The union business agent said he'd prefer to see Hostess sold.

"It's definitely got to be better than what this company's trying to implement. There are other bakeries out there looking to purchase some of these locations. These employees have the opportunity to go back in (under a new owner)."

Jeff Swiatek, The Indianapolis Star



The company cited increasing medical costs . . .
Gee, I wonder why that happened.


Too many employees have eaten too many twinkies?


Or maybe the elephant in the room. Obamacare.


May I suggest it is the jackass, rather than the elephant, in the room?


...Forewarned...I mean Foreward!!!


Employees did not want a partial pay cut as offered by their employer. Instead they followed their union's advice to hold strong ... and they end up with a 100% pay cut.


You can bet the union officials won't be hurting though. Meanwhile, the workers voted to not have a job anymore......Perfect!!! Be careful what you wish for. Just shows how the union has the best interest of their members in mind. NOT!!!!!

Say No To Tourist's

Take the pay cut and keep your jobs or become another statistic, 8% its really pretty simple.


I'm boycotting the Hostess bankruptcy, tomorrow I'm going to hang a Twinkie from the tree in my frontyard.


That oughta drive all the Ding Dongs over the edge. :-)


Actually, Hostess was "Bained". It was bought by a private hedge fund, loaded with debt while the new owners extracted capital, got concessions from employees, went into Chapter 11, asked for more concessions (probably knowing full well that by then they were going to get resistance unlike the first wave of concessions), and then began liquidation. How much you wanna bet they knew from the start it would end this way - and they could blame the unions all the way to the bank.


Are you stating this as fact or an assumption?


Fact. Details on Wikipedia, or Daily Kos for more recent news.


Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the just announced Hostess liquidation, one that will be largely debated and discussed in the media, or maybe not at all, is the curious cast of characters and the peculiar history of this particular bankruptcy. Some may not be aware that the company's Chapter 11 (or colloquially known as 22) bankruptcy filing this January, which today became a Chapter 7 liquidation, was the second one in the company's recent history, with Hostess, previously Interstate Bakeries, emerging from its previous protracted multi-year bankruptcy in 2009. What is curious is that its emergence had all the drama of a anti-Mitt Romney PAC funded thriller, with a PE firm, in this case Ripplewood holdings, injecting $130 million in order to obtain equity control of Hostess as it was emerging last time. There were also more hedge funds, investment banks, strategic buyers, politicians involved in this particular story than one can shake a deep fried numismatic value Twinkie at. More importantly, however, as America has been habituated following the last season of the reality TV show known as the presidential election, if Private Equity then "bad." Only this time there is a twist: because it wasn't really PE that was the pure evil in the Obama long-term campaign, it was associating PE with Republicans, and thus: with jobs outsourcing. And here comes the Hostess twist: because Tim Collins of Ripplewood, was a prominent Democrat, a position which allowed him to get involved in the first bankruptcy process in the first place, due to his proximity with the Teamsters' long-term heartthrob Dick Gephardt (whose consulting group just happens to also be an equity owner of Hostess). In other words, the traditional republican-cum-PE scapegoating strategy here will be a tough one to pull off since the narrative collapses when considering that it was a Democrat who rescued the firm, only to see it implode in a trainwreck that has resulted in the liquidation of a legendary brand, and 18,500 layoffs.

But it only gets better. Because the full cast of characters involved here is quite stunning, as David Kaplan summarized so well recently:

Ripplewood is run by Tim Collins, 55, who's been at the center of other famed PE transactions. Known as a brilliant capitalist-philanthropist-networker, he's an eclectic character: a Democrat in an industry of Republicans; an Adirondack enthusiast dreaded by pheasant and fish; a board member at the Yale divinity and business schools; and someone who took a year at 31 to work at a refugee camp in the Sudan. Ripplewood orchestrated the $1.1 billion turnaround in 2000 of the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, which marked the first time that foreign interests controlled a Japanese bank. (Collins made the cover of Fortune Asia for it.) The bank was renamed Shinsei, and in 2004 it had a lucrative initial public stock offering. Far less fortunately, in 2007 Ripplewood acquired Reader's Digest -- and saw its $275 million investment vanish in Reader's Digest's bankruptcy filing in 2009. (Collins reportedly had visions of merging Reader's Digest with the magazine division of Time Warner (TWX), which owns Fortune.)

Ripplewood's foray into Hostess was partly enabled by Collins's connections in the Democratic Party. He wanted to explore deals with union-involved companies and sought the help of former congressman Gephardt, who in 2005 founded the Gephardt Group, an Atlanta consulting firm that provides "labor advisory services." In his 2004 presidential bid, Gephardt -- whose father was a Teamsters milk truck driver -- was endorsed by 21 of the largest U.S. labor unions; in 2003, Collins was one of 19 "founding members" of Gephardt's New York State leadership committee. (Today, Ripplewood and Hostess are listed online as major clients of Gephardt's consulting group, which is also an equity owner of Hostess.) Back when Hostess was coming out of the first bankruptcy, Gephardt's credibility with both Ripplewood and the Teamsters gave them each a little more room to break bread.

During this first bankruptcy, Hostess was almost sold. In 2007 it warded off a $580 million bid from its biggest competitor, Bimbo Bakeries USA. Bimbo Bakeries USA is part of Grupo Bimbo, the Mexican baking giant that owns such brands as Sara Lee, Entenmann's, Freihofer's, Arnold, Boboli, Ball Park Buns, and Thomas' English Muffins. Joining Bimbo in the bid were the union-friendly investment arm of supermarket titan Ron Burkle and the Teamsters themselves.

Hostess was able to exit bankruptcy in 2009 for three reasons. The first was Ripplewood's equity infusion of $130 million in return for control of the company (it currently owns about two-thirds of the equity). The second reason: substantial concessions by the two big unions. Annual labor cost savings to the company were about $110 million; thousands of union members lost their jobs. The third reason: Lenders agreed to stay in the game rather than drive Hostess into liquidation and take whatever pieces were left. The key lenders were Silver Point and Monarch. Both are hedge funds that specialize in investing in distressed companies -- whether you call them saviors or vultures depends on whether you're getting fed or getting eaten.

Based in Greenwich, Conn., Silver Point was founded in 2002 and has approximately $6.5 billion under management; its two co-founders are 49-year-old Edward Mulé and 47-year-old Robert O'Shea, both former Goldman Sachs (GS) partners. Silver Point helped bail out Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Delphi, CIT Group, and various TV stations. Monarch, based in Manhattan, was created in 2008 as a spinoff from the Quadrangle Group. It reportedly has more than $3 billion under management; among its three co-founders are 52-year-old Michael Weinstock and 48-yearold Andrew Herenstein, both formerly of Lazard. Monarch has invested in Eddie Bauer and the Texas Rangers. (In 2010, after Herenstein sent a letter to baseball teams warning them not to approve a sale of the Rangers "at a price below fair market value," the letter became public, and the Dallas Morning News ran this ominous blog headline: MONARCH ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL THREATENS BASEBALL.)

Silver Point and Monarch, along with about 20 other lenders, owned about $450 million of Hostess secured debt at the time of the bankruptcy filing in 2004, according to court records. Remarkably, though -- given that Hostess's financials are now supposed to be an open book in federal bankruptcy court -- it's unclear how much the lenders actually paid for those notes. But it's presumably less than face value. Opportunistic investors like Silver Point and Monarch commonly buy distressed debt at a considerable discount. Their strategy: Invest in fundamentally "good" companies that have "bad" capital structures brought about by overborrowing, bankruptcy, or other corporate stresses.

Neither the specific amount put up by each investor nor the percentage of the total debt is public record (In re Hostess Brands, Case No. 12-22052). So it's impossible to know for sure how much "skin in the game" the creditors have. But according to sources with knowledge of Hostess's debt structure, Silver Point owns about 30% of the debt; Monarch, also about 30%; and the other lenders combined own the remaining 40%. Clearly, it was Silver Point and Monarch, along with Ripplewood, that had the biggest bets going forward.

Confused yet? Here it is summarized in a schematic:

The rest of the story is your typical post-emergency NewCo gone horribly wrong with a prominent role for the Snafu here reserved to Hostess restructuring banker Miller Buckfire for not cutting enough of the firm's pre-petition debt, with the straw that broke the camel's back being, what else, unfunded pension liabilities. As was explained back in July:

The critical issue in the bankruptcy is legacy pensions. Hostess has roughly $2 billion in unfunded pension liabilities to its various unions' workers -- the Teamsters but also the Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union (which has largely chosen not to contest what Hostess wants to do -- that is, to get out of much of that obligation). If the bankruptcy court lets Hostess off the pension hook -- which often happens in these cases -- it only moves the struggle outside the courthouse, and the ante goes up. For the Teamsters can then call a strike -- which its Hostess employees have already ratified by a 9-to-1 margin. If the court doesn't grant relief, Hostess can seek liquidation, which would mean that some creditors get some money, but equity would be gone for good, as would a lot of jobs. Either way, each side holds a nuclear warhead with which to annihilate the company.

Liquidation is what ended up happening, as no compromise was possible, and the magic money tree, primarily as a result of equityholders (and creditors) refusing to inject any more cash.

Yet while the balance sheet burden was certainly the pension liabilities, what precipitated the liquidation was the income statement, and more accurately, the cash flow statement, or specifically the lack of cash flow.

as the company tried to reinvent itself in 2009 and 2010, external currents were running against it. The Great Recession hurt many consumer brands generally, and the prices of the commodities that Hostess relied on -- corn, sugar, flour -- went up, which is the opposite of what's supposed to happen in a downturn. In addition, the bakery industry underwent more consolidation when Sara Lee sold out to Bimbo.

Those fortuities aggravated Hostess's two root problems -- a highly leveraged capital structure that had little margin of safety, and high labor costs. Neither problem was adequately addressed in the first bankruptcy, and neither existed to the same degree in major competitors like Bimbo and Flowers Food (owner of such brands as Nature's Own and Tastykake). On exiting the first bankruptcy, Hostess's total debt load was nearly $670 million. That was well above what it went into bankruptcy with in the first place -- an unusual circumstance that the company justified on expectations of "growing" into its capital structure.

But the company was dead wrong. Its debt sowed the very seeds of the next bankruptcy. Looking back on the decision to reinvest in Hostess in the first bankruptcy, one of the lenders now says, "If you look in the dictionary at the definition of throwing good money after bad, there should be a picture of Hostess beside it."

By late 2011, Hostess was getting, well, creamed. Its sales last year -- $2.5 billion -- were down about 11% from 2008 and down 28% from 2004. (Twinkies remain the best individual seller -- 323 million of them in the 52-week period ending June 29, give or take a splurt.) Overall, Hostess lost $341 million in fiscal 2011, 2½ times the loss of the prior year -- and by early 2012, primarily because of burgeoning interest obligations, its debt had grown to about $860 million.

As revenue declined, the company continued to burn cash -- in the second half of 2011, the rate was $2 million a week. The liquidity crunch forced Ripplewood in the early spring of 2011 to pump in $40 million more in return for more equity as well as debt that was subordinate to that held by Silver Point and Monarch. In August -- to save a company teetering on the edge of fiscal calamity and forced liquidation -- Silver Point, Monarch, and the group of other lenders put up an additional $30 million to see if a negotiated turnaround was possible.

They turned to the unions and demanded new concessions. But the unions, having three years earlier given up thousands of jobs and millions in benefits, flatly refused.

The company was going to pieces -- again -- and Hostess filed for Chapter 11 protection -- again -- in January of this year. This time, though, the moneymen were no longer on the same page. As the majority equity holder, Ripplewood badly wanted to keep Hostess out of bankruptcy. It pleaded with the lenders to show flexibility, but they were not so inclined. They lenders held superior fiscal hands and had less downside if Hostess failed. In the event of a bankruptcy, given all the assets Hostess owned, the lenders would still walk away with millions.

There is much more to this story, but the ending is well-known to all, and it is not a happy one.

End result: a near total loss for everyone involved, except the secured creditors of course, who will now get pennies on the dollar, or perhaps even par, for their claims when all is said and done.

Sadly, in many ways Hostess is now indicative of that just as insolvent larger corporation, the USA, whose insurmountable balance sheet liabilities will be the eventual catalyst for its collapse, but only once the Income Statement and the Cash Flow sheet join in. For now, the Fed provides the flow needed to avoid the day of reckoning, but everything ends eventually.

In the meantime, what the Hostess story will hopefully teach the always gullible public, is that nothing is ever black or white, and there are numerous shades of gray in every story: even one in which an "evil" PE firm is unable to come to resolution with labor unions, despite the man in charge of it all being a prominent democrat. Because when it comes to money other things such alliances, ideology and certainly politics are always, always, secondary. Sadly, ever more Americans will be forced to learn this lesson the hard way.


Lanivan, ah I think it's your move...


Hmmm. This can't be good, can it?


Yummy! Did you know there are 39 different chemicals in Twinkies? How we love our forbidden sweets! I do admit loving it when my mother packed a Twinkie in my lunch instead of the usual homemade cookies (during the 50's). My own kids grew up reading labels and refused to eat anything that had so many preservatives. To think so many hundreds of millions $$ wrapped up in packages of Ding-Dongs....


Thanks for the details, Vlad. Your research points out something very important - things are rarely black or white. It's so satisfying to be able to say the fault lies with one of the following: unions, Obama, democrats, republicans, Wall street, Snap recipients, etc. Things are never that simple.


Really? You seemed to have a fairly god view on he luminance of HS intubation when you said "Actually, Hostess was "Bained". It was bought by a private hedge fund, loaded with debt while the new owners extracted capital, got concessions from employees, went into Chapter 11, asked for more concessions (probably knowing full well that by then they were going to get resistance unlike the first wave of concessions), and then began liquidation. How much you wanna bet they knew from the start it would end this way - and they could blame the unions all the way to the bank."

I am confused now...


Miss the edit feature when using my iPad.


Why the confusion? My comment was essentially a distillation of Vlad's more in- depth reply. The point is this: many of the comments here were anti-union right from the get-go. Liquidation was the direct result of greedy unions who wouldn't budge. The facts, as is usually the case, show that this was a much more complicated case. I stand by my comment.


Of course you do.


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